Regions lobbying the European Union: Organizational Forms, Policy Portfolios and Venue Selection by Fraussen, B. & Donas, T.
1 
 
Regions Lobbying the European Union: Organizational Forms, Policy 
Portfolios and Venue Selection 
 
Dr Bert Fraussen (Australian National University and University of Antwerp) 
Dr Tom Donas (University of Antwerp) 
 
Introduction 
During the past decades, significant changes have taken place in the European 
political order, as nation states were challenged by three fundamental developments. 
Since the 1960s, almost all Western European states have decentralized some 
policymaking competences to meso-level authorities, that is, political entities situated 
between the national and the local level of governance (Hooghe et al. 2010). As a result, 
these subnational authorities (SNAs) nowadays play a much more important role in 
policymaking processes and the provision of public goods to citizens. Almost 
simultaneously, a second development took place, as the European Union (EU) 
engendered a transfer of power and a pooling of sovereignty from the nation states to 
supranational institutions. Furthermore, national governments also increasingly started 
delegating critical tasks to other public and private agents, resulting in a closer 
involvement of other organizations in policymaking and a blurring of the boundaries 
between public and private spheres. Hence, a trend towards decentralization was 
accompanied by an upward competence pull resulting from deepening European 
integration, as well as a broadening of networks of governance.  
As many public policies are increasingly initiated and shaped at the European 
level, this has become an increasingly relevant political venue for political elites, 
including those at the subnational level. Policy domains in which substantial quantities 
of EU law have to be implemented frequently are often the competences assigned to 
subnational entities, for example, education, health and environmental affairs. 
Furthermore, a considerable number of EU policies have a direct or indirect effect on 
sub-state interests. These policies include redistributive matters (such as the Cohesion 
and Structural Funds, as well as the Common Agricultural Policy), yet also regulatory 
initiatives and policy programs (for instance in the area of transport and infrastructure) 
that affect the economic competitiveness of regional entities. Moreover, since the 
dynamics of the single market considerably affect the economic room for manoeuvre of 
regional political elites, the European integrated economy, rather than the national 
economy, has become a crucial point of reference for them. 
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Notwithstanding this increased level of interdependence, key European 
institutions, such as the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, formally still 
primarily rely on member-states positions, or the voice of directly elected 
representatives. As a result, the representation of regional and sub-state interests in the 
European political order remains rather informal and indirect. Nevertheless, a 
haphazard or arbitrary representation of sub-state interests could contribute to a 
problem of input-legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). That is, in many member states, political 
consensus building and processes of accountability take place at the regional level, while 
it is the central government that represents these member states in the EU. Without any 
sub-state representation, the EU could give rise to a sort of representational gap for such 
countries. A shortage of regional input in policymaking processes might furthermore 
also affect output-legitimacy, or the quality of EU policies. Regional policymakers have 
often acquired considerable expertise and experience concerning particular EU policies, 
as they are quite regularly involved in the implementation and execution of EU 
distributive and regulatory policies. This knowhow could be highly relevant to EU-level 
policymakers when new political initiatives are being developed, or at times when 
existing legislation is being evaluated or revised.  
In this chapter, we zoom in on the organizational forms, policy portfolios and 
venue selection of regions at the EU level. We first provide a literature review and 
address how multilevel governance shapes the relations between subnational 
authorities and the central government. Next, we discuss the scope and diversity of EU-
level territorial mobilization, and clarify why some sub-state jurisdictions are more 
likely to be active at the supranational level. Subsequently, we analyse the activities of 
these regional representations in Brussels by taking a closer look at the amount and the 
nature of the policy issues that these regions focus on, as well as the particular 
institutional venues that they prioritize in their lobbying activities.  
 
Regional authorities, the nation state and multilevel governance 
The extent to which the European political system can be characterized as a 
governmental arena, in which the member-states still play a predominant and central 
role, represents a fundamental question in political science (Marks et al. 1996; 
Moravcsik 1998). The study of regional authorities and their involvement in EU-affairs is 
considered quintessential in this debate, as it provides a key case to observe the possible 
3 
 
implications of the up- and downward transfer of policy competences (Hooghe 1995, 
1996; Hooghe and Marks 1996).  
Regarding the development of research on the interplay between subnational 
authorities, national governments and the EU institutions, Marks and Hooghe’s early 
work on regional and structural policymaking, in which they developed the concept of 
multilevel governance, has had a great impact (Marks 1992, 1993; Hooghe and Marks 
2001). One of their core expectations was that the potential redistributive impact of EU 
regional policymaking would energize and stimulate regional interest representation. 
When establishing regional policies (such as Cohesion and Structural funding), EU 
policymakers and in particular the European Commission may prefer to directly interact 
with regional interests. This enables them, at times,  to bypass central state executives, 
or to diminish the influence of central state executives in some EU matters. This pattern 
became particularly manifest with the establishment of the cohesion policy in the mid-
1980s. In addition, the EU facilitated the construction of a dynamic meso-level, for 
instance by establishing the NUTS-nomenclature1, making structural funds conditional 
on specific administrative and institutional conditions and involving regional authorities 
in the execution of these programs, as well as by encouraging trans-regional 
collaboration (for instance via its INTERREG-program). 
Another point of view, however, is that central government executives still have 
considerable capabilities to constrain or weaken the autonomy and discretion of sub-
state entities. Scholars have for instance argued that precisely these various acts of – 
downward and upward – delegation enable European nation states to maintain their 
central role, albeit in a different form (Bache and Jones 2000; Beyers and Bursens 2013). 
State-centered scholars frequently highlight the enduring gate-keeping capacities of 
central state executives within the European political order (Moravcsik 1998). In 
contrast to the initial expectations concerning multilevel governance, recent research in 
this area has showed that the combination of European integration and processes of 
devolution and regionalization has not led to a hollowing out of central government 
agencies and ministries, nor undermined the importance of the member-states. Rather 
than bypassing the central state, work in this field has increasingly demonstrated that 
sub-state authorities actually collaborate intensively with central state agencies in many 
                                                          
1  For an explanation of NUTS see 




countries, and do not tend to bypass central state agencies (Tatham 2008, 2010, 2012; 
Moore 2008).  
 
Mobilization of regional authorities in Brussels  
Subnational authorities (SNAs), such as regions, provinces and cities, are 
increasingly mobilized at the European level. Much research has been conducted on the 
liaison offices, the individual presences of subnational executives in Brussels. Over time, 
the number of these offices has increased tremendously, from about 54 in 1993 (see 
Marks et al. 1996) to more than 200 today, a development that closely follows the 
process of EU enlargement. One of the most well-known examples probably involves the 
regional representation of Bavaria, which is located in the historic building of the former 
Institut Pasteur, only a few meters away from the European Parliament. In a previous 
project, that aimed to describe and clarify the representation of SNAs in Brussels, it was 
demonstrated that SNAs often rely on multiple organizational forms (Donas and Beyers 
2013). This project only included SNAs that are located at the first level below the 
central government and that have an average population of more than 150,000 people; 
while it also excluded deconcentrated administrative units (n= 297). Applying this 
definition, it became clear that many SNAs have established a Brussel’s or liaison office 
(n= 175). The resources that these offices have at their disposal vary greatly. While there 
are a few offices that have a staff of more than twenty employees, such as the 
representations of some German regions or Länder, most of them employ a rather 
limited amount of people (median = 4). Yet the scope and diversity of territorial 
representation in Brussels is much broader than these individual representations. In 
some cases, SNAs from a similar country join forces to create a national association, 
enabling them to share the costs of establishing a presence in Brussels. In this regard, we 
can distinguish between complete national associations, including all SNAs of one 
member-state (for instance, the Irish Regions Office or the Danish Regions Office), and 
partial national associations, which gather only some SNAs of the same country, (such as 
the joint office of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, or the North-Sweden European 
Office which combines the representation of Norrbotten County and Västerbotten 
County). 
As well as these national associations, regions also frequently engage in another 
form of collective action, namely trans-regional associations, which group multiple 
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regions from different countries. About 95 percent of the identified SNAs were member 
of one of the 68 trans-regional associations at the time of writing. While some of these 
trans-regional associations have a rather generalist orientation, such as the AER, the 
Assembly of European Regions, others are narrower in scope and focus on a particular 
policy field or topic. Examples of his last category include trans-regional associations 
such as the Airport Regions Conference (ARC) or the European Textile Collectivities 
Association (ACTE). Trans-regional associations generally group regions that have a 
common interest in a certain policy field, or similar policy preferences on certain topics. 
Through these associations, regions can exchange information and coordinate their 
strategies in a more structured way. Especially in the EU’s highly crowded policy 
environment, these collective forms of representation, as noted elsewhere in this 
collection, can be quite valuable, as they facilitate information flows. Likewise, 
policymakers are often more sensitive to the demands of associations, compared to 
requests from individual offices, demonstrating the value of collective action in the EU 
policy process. 
 
 [table 1 here] 
 
This broader perspective leads to the conclusion that the scope and diversity of 
EU-level territorial mobilization is much more extensive than generally considered. Yet, 
an important question involves whether there is a bias in the representation of regional 
interests, for instance if it is skewed towards resourceful and politically powerful 
regions. The fact that a large variety of regions are, in one form or another, represented 
in Brussels, indicates that sub-state representation at the EU level has become quite 
common. Yet, there are substantial differences regarding the (degree of) representation 
of different types of regions. While one conclusion could be that peripheral regions 
might benefit from the opportunity to directly mobilize in Brussels, especially resource-
full SNAs, SNAs benefiting from a high level of self-rule, and SNAs harboring regionalist 
political parties, are relatively more active in Brussels (Donas and Beyers 2013). These 
regions more frequently establish a liaison office, and also are more likely to occupy a 
prominent position in various trans-regional associations. The combination of 
organizational forms allows these SNAs to mobilize a large variety of ‘policy goods’ and 
to considerably improve their chances of gaining attention from EU policymakers. In the 
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remainder of this chapter, we will take a closer look at the role of  liaison offices, and address 
their activities in Brussels in more detail. 
 
Policy portfolios  
Brussels liaison offices can be considered as communication channels or 
intermediaries between regions and EU institutions. As they seek to represent territorial 
interests of both a public and private nature, their policy interests can be rather broad 
and diverse. Given that their resources are generally quite limited, however, they will 
not be able to take action on all policy issues that are potentially of interest to them but 
rather prioritise in terms of which policy areas it is possible to most effectively engage 
in, in order to gain maximum advantage for their particular region. Therefore, it is 
interesting to explore how these offices translate their rather general mission into 
specific political activities, which offer more insight into the type of interests that these 
regional lobbyists represent. In the next paragraphs, we will briefly discuss the policy 
portfolio of these organizations, the set of domains and policy issues in which they 
invest resources. 
An analysis of the policy portfolio of 127 regional representations demonstrated 
that they mostly have a quite generalist orientation (Donas et al. 2014). On average, 
these actors indicated to monitor developments in about 11 policy domains, which 
implies that their policy interests in Brussels are usually quite broad and encompassing. 
However, their lobbying activities in the past six months proved to be much more 
restricted, and generally remain limited to two or three legislative issues. Hence, while 
these regional representations might monitor several policy fields, they only prioritize a 
fairly limited number of legislative issues in their lobbying behavior. If these issues are 
considered in more detail, and linked to the Directorate-Generals of the European 
Commission (DGs) it is DG REGIO that attracts most lobbying activity. The great majority 
(84 percent) of regional offices that monitor policy issues related to this DG also 
engaged in actual lobbying activities on these matters. For the other DGs, in contrast, the 
activities of the regional representations mostly remain limited to monitoring policy 
developments.  
Another way to assess the policy portfolios of these regional representations is to 
consider the type of issues which they prioritize. If we distinguish between regulatory 
and redistributive issues, it seems that three types of regional representations can be 
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identified. First, there is a group of offices that primarily focuses on monitoring, and thus 
rarely engages in lobbying on specific policy issues. Next, there is a large set of 
representations that do frequently engage in lobbying. Yet, their actions are mostly 
restricted to redistributive issues, for instance the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, for instance, or Cohesion Policy. Finally, a small minority of regional 
representations not only lobbies on redistributive issues, but also demonstrates activity 
on issues of regulatory nature, like the Air Quality Directive or the Financial Transaction 
Tax. These are mostly regions that enjoy much autonomy and also have established ties 
with subnational private actors. For instance, regions that also focused on regulatory 
matters frequently reported relations with regional private interests, such as employer 
associations and companies within specific sectors. Often, these private actors were 
involved in the organization’s governance, for instance through staff seconded from 
private sector specialists, or representation of these actors in advisory groups or the 
board of the organization. Regions who mostly lobbied on redistributive issues did not 
share these organizational features, but rather had important connections to trans-
regional associations. As a result, it appears that the size and the nature of a policy 
portfolio is not primarily affected by the capacity of an office in terms of staff, but also 
results from its connections to other public and private interests. This suggests that the 
interests that regional offices represent are considerably affected by the input they 
receive from other societal actors.  
 
Venue selection 
Policymaking in the EU has often been depicted as a multilevel, multi-institutional 
process, offering organized interest multiple avenues to consider for exercising policy 
influence (Greenwood 2003; Coen and Richardson 2009). However, while regional 
representatives can interact with a mix of national (such as the Permanent 
Representation) and supranational institutions (like the European Parliament and the 
European Commission), due to constraints in time and resources they cannot engage 
with all possible venues and actors. This third part of the chapter will focus on the extent 
to which regional representations focus on multiple venues, or rather prioritize 
interaction with certain institutions in their lobbying activities. 
Broadly speaking, a regional representation can be expected to focus on four key 
institutions in Brussels when seeking to influence a specific policy proposal, namely the 
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EU Commission, the EU Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the Permanent 
Representation (PR) of its home country (whose officials are involved in Council 
working groups and meetings). Given the fragmented nature of the European 
Commission, a distinction will be made between the EU Commissioner (including 
his/her cabinet) and the civil servants in the DGs, who represent the core of the 
European bureaucracy and are responsible for most of the preparatory work. Obviously, 
this framework provides a somewhat simplified version of the political reality. Also 
within these five venues, one could identify different access points. An actor could focus 
on the EU Commissioner or EC DG in charge of the issue (or the EP rapporteur), but it 
might also be an interesting option to interact with other EU Commissioners, DGs or 
MEPs that have been identified as having a considerable interest in the issue at hand. 
Likewise, it might be easier to approach a Commissioner or MEP that originates from the 
same member state as the regional representation. Finally, within the permanent 
representation, a distinction might be made between access to the working groups and 
the COREPER level.  
To what extent do regional representations engage in contacts with all these 
institutions? Results from a survey of 127 regional representations, focused on their 
interaction with these venues over a period of 6 months, are reported in Figure 1. A 
large majority of the regional representations surveyed have regular contact with EU 
institutions and the PR of their home country, as they interact with these venues at least 
on a monthly basis. If we consider the relative importance of these different venues, 
regional representations appear to have most contact with the civil servants of the 
European Commission, followed by their Permanent Representations, Members of 
European Parliament and Members of the Committee of the Regions. The high level of 
interaction with EC civil servants can probably be explained by the important legislative 
and agenda setting role of the EC, as well as its management of EU finances (Bouwen 
2009: 20). Furthermore, the high level of interaction with MEPs illustrates the growing 
importance of this venue as a result of its increase in legislative powers in the past two 
decades. The EU Commissioner clearly is a more difficult venue to reach. Nonetheless, 
only a few offices indicated that they had had no contact with the Commissioner or his 
cabinet. 




Notwithstanding these general trends, we also observe differences regarding the 
intensity of the interaction with these different venues. In terms of access and possible 
influence, it probably makes a significant difference whether one enjoys daily or 
monthly contacts. While the permanent representation is an important contact point for 
all regional representations, the intensity of the contacts differs considerably. Whereas 
some 20 percent of the regional offices have daily interactions with its PR, 50 percent 
meets them on a weekly basis, while 27 percent only engages in monthly interactions. 
Furthermore, whilst we provide a general picture here, the ‘venue shopping behavior’ of 
regional representation is also shaped by the nature of particular issues (such as its 
regulatory or redistributive nature), as well as the extent to which regional preferences 
are aligned with the policy views of specific institutions (for a more elaborate discussion 
and analysis of how these factors come into play, see Beyers et al. 2015).  
 
Discussion  
Although several regional representations have a high profile in Brussels and 
engage with various institutional venues, a considerable number of SNAs does not 
actively mobilize at the EU level. Furthermore, the representation of various regions is 
highly unsure and volatile. Several of them refrain from lobbying and solely focus on 
monitoring policy developments. These findings are in line with a conclusion repeatedly 
noted in the interest group literature, namely that interest representation tends to be 
biased towards a select group of interests, or skewed towards well-endowed actors 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Schlozman et al. 2012). This tendency might have been 
strengthened by the recent financial crisis, and its repercussions on the available budget 
to open and maintain a permanent presence in Brussels. Several regions from member 
states where the crisis had resulted in reductions of regional budgets (such as Greece, 
Spain, Italy and the UK) substantially decreased or even ceased their activities in 
Brussels. Also, representations from some less prosperous, mostly Eastern European 
member states, seem to have scaled down their presence. 
We would like to end this chapter with a reflection on what the mobilization of 
regions in Brussels implies for intergovernmental relations at the national level. Higher 
amounts of competence transfers, from the national to the regional level, clearly 
increase the likelihood that regions will open a liaison office in Brussels and establish 
more contacts with other European regions and EU institutions. This is a dynamic that 
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could possibly stimulate bypassing behavior, implying that regions reduce the exchange 
of information with other regions from their member state, or seek to circumvent the 
national government. So far, this expectation does not appear to have materialized, as 
more regional autonomy does not automatically imply a higher intensity of trans-
regional networking, or a fragmentation of member state representation. Although 
regional offices from more autonomous regions display a higher level of activity in 
Brussels, interaction with their national counterparts has remained crucial. For instance, 
regional offices predominantly exchange information with other regions that are 
geographically proximate, in particular those from their own member state (Beyers and 
Donas 2014). As importantly, regional representations with a higher level of self-
autonomy are actually more likely to cooperate intensively with their national 
Permanent Representation in Brussels. Consequently, it seems that regional 




Table 1. Representation of SNAs (n=297) in Brussels 
Representation type N 
Liasion/Brussels office 175 
Transregional associations 68 
Complete national associations 7 
Partial national associations 25 
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